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Affective Dispositions And Cognitive Skills In Critical Thinking:
Implications For Measurement, Training, And Team Performance
Timothy John Willis
ABSTRACT
This study attempts to increase critical thinking among teams by making them
cognizant of seven critical thinking dimensions. Forty three-person teams of
undergraduates worked together on a complex decision-making task. Each team received
training in and was asked to ensure their group exhibited the characteristics of cognitive
skills, affective dispositions, both of these or neither. Critical thinking was assessed using
self-report, behavioral observation rating, and expert outcome analysis. The findings
suggest training in affective dispositions increases the exhibition of at least one
dimensions of critical thinking. A behavioral measurement is presented and evaluated
with respect to established critical thinking methods.

iv

The teaching techniques of Socrates, whereby probing questions are asked of
students to lead them toward knowledge, are often cited as the first recorded instance of
critical thinking (Fasko, 2003). Descartes subsequently helped move the study of the
mind from the realm of theology to the realm of pre-science by suggesting thinking is the
property of the mind, and as such it is endowed with certain innate knowledge (Schultz &
Schultz, 1996). Two hundred years later, however, John Locke proposed the notion that
the mind without experience was a tabula rasa, or blank slate. He believed ideas were a
result of experience and complex ideas were simply many simple ideas joined together
(Fasko, 2003). Regardless of with whom you agreed, it was clear the scientific study of
thought had begun.
The nineteenth century saw rise to modern psychology and with it new ways of
explaining thinking. Beginning with Wilhelm Wundt, and continuing with Edward
Titchener, thinking was assessed and explored using introspection. Titchener proposed
an elaborate structure of consciousness comprising three states: sensations, images, and
affective states (Schultz & Schultz, 1996). John B. Watson later denied even the
existence of a consciousness; he believed thinking was nothing more than sub-vocal
speech (Fasko, 2003). With the very existence of thinking in question, it seemed a
complete change in perspective was needed.
And so it seemed everything from physics to psychology was beginning to shift
from the reductionistic introspection associated with Wundt and Titchener toward the
more integrative school of gestalt. Led by Wertheimer, Kohler, and Koffka, the gestalt
school viewed thinking as an active, constructive process. This active view of thought
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was later influenced by the burgeoning interest in computer technology, and led naturally
to the information-processing model of thinking that was prevalent in the 1960s. This
model provides a functional, organized framework for understanding mental processes
using the processes of attention, encoding and retrieval, and is evocative of the model
used to understand the way computers processes information. In the early 1980s, the
information-processing model evolved into a more involved, more active thought
process—a framework ideally suited to the investigation of critical thinking (Fasko,
2003).
In part in response to the newly active, involved thought process models that were
being proposed during this time, many researchers became increasingly aware of the
automatic aspects of human thinking. In order to survive in an increasingly hostile world,
humans have developed the ability to simplify their existence somewhat through
automation. Several theories of the process by which this occurs were developed in part
to help explain why some situations elicit a reasoned response from someone while other
situations are responded to automatically. One automaticity theory suggests that as a
person begins to learn a particular skill, he or she works through mental processing
algorithms (Logan, 1988). For example, during the beginning of her stay in a foreign
land, a traveler might perform a mental conversion of the price of items in a store to her
home currency each time she makes a purchase. Eventually she will recall from memory
rather than calculate prices for items frequently purchased. In this way, active
computation has been reduced or eliminated and the much less effortful process of
memory retrieval provides the information previously acquired through computation.
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Another form of automaticity involves the caching of solutions to common
problems. In much the same way people use shortcuts and automatic means of
information processing, so too can they cache solutions to common problems for use at a
later time. In fact, we can use the knowledge of a person’s tendencies to use the same
solutions over and over in similar situations to predict their behavior (Markman &
Gentner, 2001).
Through the process of categorization people classify things into categories and
draw inferences from those categories. Categorization can be divided into domaingeneral processes such as the role of similarity, or domain-specific processes such as in
the study of cross-cultural differences in categorization (Markman & Gentner, 2001).
The concept of similarity refers to the comparing of stimulus objects with prototype
objects in order to categorize new objects. These stored category prototypes are
comprised of the most typical features of the members of the category it represents; new
objects are placed into categories according to their similarity to the prototype.

Mental Models
In an attempt to understand how humans perceive and interact with their
environment, scientists rely heavily on the concept of the mental model as a framework
for understanding certain cognitive processes. Markman and Gentner (2001) broadly
define mental models as “representation[s] of some domain or situation that supports
understanding, reasoning, or prediction” (p.229), yet this definition is far from
incontrovertible, and has been criticized as being so general that it does not accurately
3

differentiate mental models from knowledge systems. Rouse and Morris (1986) review
several alternative definitions of mental models, recognizing that most theories are
developed to explain a specific situation or phenomenon, and provide a general
definition: a mental model is a “mechanism whereby humans generate descriptions of
system purpose and form, explanations of system functioning and observed system states,
and predictions of future system states” (p. 360). Mental models have been theorized to
help individuals predict and explain behavior, draw inferences and make predictions,
determine appropriate actions, recognize and remember relationships among system
variables, understand expectations, and organize and process new information in a rapid
and flexible manner (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993).
Two types of mental models are generally recognized: logical mental models and
causal mental models. People form logical mental models in order to organize complex
series of items and relationships when engaging in logical reasoning tasks. These models
are developed as a way of organizing and categorizing information for a specific task,
and are discarded after the task has been accomplished. Causal mental models, on the
other hand, are mental representations used in reasoning that are based on long-term
knowledge or theories. An example of this type of mental model is a mental simulation
of events yet to occur. These simulations are qualitative rather than quantitative, in that
they use imagery rather than calculations.
Hegarty and Just (1993) studied the processes by which people form mental
models. They measured the time it took for individuals to solve a mechanical
comprehension test when given a textual description, a diagrammatic description, or both.
4

They found evidence that subjects in all conditions were constructing mental models of
the mechanical system they were asked to explain, but the group that was given text and
diagrams performed better than those given one or the other. Subsequent eye-fixation
analysis showed the readers were constructing mental models incrementally by reading
and re-reading a line of text before integrating that information with the diagram. These
diagram consultations are thus seen as elaborative--an aid in the formation of a mental
model rather than as an aid in understating the text.
Although mental models are generally thought to be cognitive phenomena, there
is some evidence that they have a motor component as some mental simulations have
been linked to bodily movement. Schwartz and Black (1999) asked people to mentally
simulate tilting either a wide or a narrow glass as far as they could without spilling the
water it contained. They found people were usually quite inaccurate when asked to
visualize and report how far they could tilt each glass, but when they closed their eyes
and tilted empty glasses they were much more likely to report the correct angle. Kathleen
Metz (1985) found children often used hand motions to simulate the motion of a turning
gear when asked to predict in which direction a specific gear will rotate. Eventually the
children developed decision rules (e.g. each gear turns the opposite direction from the
one adjacent), and made decisions based on rules rather than mental simulations. These
decision rules reduce or eliminate the need to engage in mental simulation by utilizing
previously stored information, thereby reducing cognitive load. Gentner and Medina
(1998) argue that the comparison of two or more mental representations allows for the
extension and application of abstract knowledge from one setting to another. The more
5

similar the mental representations are to one another the more likely it is that knowledge
will be extended and connections between concepts strengthened by the formation of a
new decision rule. If two mental representations are very dissimilar it is likely that a new
decision rule will not be formed, knowledge will not transfer from one model to the
other, and there will be no decrease in cognitive load.
Mental models are also studied at the team level, though not without controversy.
Klimoski and Mohammed (1994) provide a review of studies supporting and refuting the
idea that teams can share a mental model or form a “shared cognition” (p.406). Klimoski
and Mohammed also discuss the relative lack of empirical evidence with regard to group
cognition, and cite as cause the difficulties in collecting such data. Endsley (1995),
however, provides evidence suggesting shared mental models can be accurately assessed
using self-report and behavioral observation methods. Training is also an integral factor
in the relationship between mental models and team performance. Rouse, CannonBowers, and Salas (1992) provide evidence that training teams to develop appropriate
expectations of likely team behaviors and explanations of observed team behaviors
enhances mental models and therefore improves performance. Cannon-Bowers, Salas,
and Converse (1993) suggest cross-training team members may help them understand the
roles and responsibilities of their teammates, and training team leaders to share their
views of the task with their team may help standardize the mental model for the group.
In summary, though the definition of mental models may be in flux, there is no
question as to their usefulness in understanding and explaining the way individuals and
groups organize and retrieve information. There is clear evidence that mental models are
6

formed spontaneously and rapidly, and are revised as new information becomes
available. There is evidence that suggests mental models may have a motor component,
and that physical movement can aid in the formation of models. Mental models assist in
the development of decision rules that guide future decisions and reduce cognitive load.
Though the study of team mental models has been stymied by the relative difficulties in
measurement, familiar methods are gaining credence from empirical studies and new
techniques are being developed to address this issue.

Critical Thinking
The study of critical thinking has been plagued by the lack of a unanimously
agreed-upon conception of the term. In fact, it has been said that there are as many
definitions of critical thinking as there are experts in the field (Benderson, 1990). Fasko
(2003) reviews nearly two dozen such definitions coming from the fields of education,
philosophy, and psychology. Each of these fields includes in their list of crucial
characteristics for critical thinking a slightly different set of behaviors, thoughts, and
qualities, and there is a great deal of disagreement regarding the underlying processes and
key requirements for something to be considered critical thinking. John Dewey
developed the first universal definition of what we now call critical thinking when he
proposed his notion of reflective thinking, which is the “active, persistent, and careful
consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds
that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends… [It] includes conscious and
voluntary effort to establish belief upon a firm basis of evidence and rationality” (Dewey,
7

1933, p. 9). Dewey further restricted his definition to say that “efforts to establish beliefs
based on evidence and rationality” (p. 9) could only be considered critical thinking if they
were both conscious and voluntary.
In what may be the most thorough attempt to obtain consensus to date, a panel of
experts in critical thinking instruction, assessment, and theory was convened in February
of 1988 to systematically study the nature and assessment of critical thinking (Facione,
1990). Over the next seventeen months, these forty-six experts used the Delphi technique
(Linstone & Turoff, 1975), an iterative, collaborative process often used to reach
consensus on conceptual definition or other problems not amenable to more quantitative
inquiry, to define the criteria of elements comprising critical thinking. Their findings
resulted in the identification of an affective disposition component to critical thinking and
a cognitive skill component (Facione, 1990). This two-factor model of critical thinking
that was developed through expert consensus was later buttressed by empirical research.
Taube (1997) tested college students’ educational values, need for cognition, ambiguity
tolerance, and critical thinking ability (as measured by the Watson-Glaser Critical
Thinking Appraisal and the Ennis-Weir Critical Thinking Essay Test). They also
collected college GPA and SAT verbal and math scores. Confirmatory factor analysis
showed the two-factor (ability and disposition) model provides a better fit with the
obtained data than a one-factor model (GFI = .955 versus .869, respectively). Taube
cautions that general mental ability may be partly or largely influencing the critical
thinking ability score. In fact, the factor loadings of SAT-math and SAT-verbal on the
critical thinking dimension were both higher than the Watson-Glaser measure, and the
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Ennis-Weir test’s loading on the ability factor of the two-factor was more than double its
loading on the disposition factor, though it was assumed it would measure both critical
thinking ability and disposition.
The study of critical thinking is unfortunately somewhat intertwined with the
concept of intelligence. We cannot in good conscious discuss critical thinking without at
least acknowledging its relationship with g. g is defined as “the ability to deal with
complexity” (Gottfredson, p.29), and as such must be included in the discussion of
critical thinking at least as it is measured by complex tasks. There is evidence, however,
that other forms of intelligence such as tacit knowledge or practical intelligence may
predict performance on situational judgment tests or simulation exercises (a common
method for assessing critical thinking) better than g (Sternberg & Hedlund, 2002).
The first major documented case of the assessment of critical thinking resulted
from an experiment Edward Glaser conducted to assess the thinking skills of high school
students (Glaser, 1941). He identified three components of critical thinking: a disposition
to carefully consider the problems one encounters, knowledge of logical reasoning
methods, and the ability to apply those methods. These findings became the beginnings
of a stream of research that would lead to the eventual development of the Watson-Glaser
Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser, 1980). Glaser, now armed with a tool to
assess his success, set out to teach critical thinking. His training program consisted of
eight lessons related to critical thinking, such as evidence, attitude, prejudice, and the
scientific method. He obtained evidence suggesting the successful teaching of critical
thinking in that the group that had received his training performed significantly better
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than the group that did not, but his findings were tempered by the subsequent realization
that the obtained critical thinking scores were significantly correlated with intelligence
measures (.46) and reading comprehension (.77) (Facione, 1984).
Since that time critical thinking has been studied in nearly every academic
discipline, particularly nursing (see Simpson & Courtney, 2002 for a review) and
education (e.g. Meyers 1996).

Critical Thinking in Industrial and Organizational Psychology
One of the ways critical thinking is linked directly to industrial and organizational
psychology is through task complexity. Task complexity is invariably linked to critical
thinking because the ability to successfully engage a complex task often requires a degree
of intelligence and the ability to think critically. The impact that general mental
processing ability (g) has on performance is evident in everyday tasks but is most evident
in “higher order thinking skills such as reasoning, abstract thinking, and problem solving”
(Gottfredson, 2002, p.27). These higher order thinking skills are among those generally
considered requisite of critical thinking (Fasko, 2003; Facione, 1990).
Performance management and assessment are often troublesome in even simple
jobs, but the task is exponentially more difficult when the performance to be assessed
involves critical thinking. Molleman and Timmerman (2003) found it difficult to assess
the knowledge and skills requisite of some of the complex jobs they assessed, in part due
to the high degree of creativity and specialization. They also found a great deal of
teamwork among those workers who thought critically as part of their jobs, and therefore
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stress the importance of being aware of the influence of team members when assessing
the performance of those workers who are likely to think critically.

Cognitive Skills and Critical Thinking
Six cognitive skills are thought to be employed by good critical thinkers: analysis,
evaluation, explanation, inference, interpretation, and self-regulation (Facione, 1990, see
Table 1). These six skills are thought to be as trainable and teachable as other skills. In
fact, research has long been conducted in the fields of education and nursing regarding
training and evaluating critical thinking skills in students and nurses (for a review of the
education literature see Meyers, 1986; for a review of the nursing literature see Simpson
& Courtney, 2002).
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Table 1
Cognitive skills of critical thinkers (Facione, 1990).
Dimension

Description

Analysis

Identifying the intended and actual inferential relationships
among statements intended to express belief, judgment,
experiences, reasons, information, or opinions

Evaluation

Assessing the credibility of statements or other representations,
and to assess the logical strength of the actual or intended
inferential relationships among those statements.

Explanation

Justifying and explaining one’s reasoning in terms of the
evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, and
contextual considerations upon which one’s results were based.

Inference

Identifying and securing elements needed to draw reasonable
conclusions. Forming conjectures and hypotheses, considering
relevant information and resulting consequences.

Interpretation

Comprehending and expressing the meaning or significance of a
wide variety of experiences, situations, data, events, judgments,
conventions, beliefs, rules, procedures, or criteria.

Self-regulation

Monitoring the elements and the results of one’s cognitive
activities. Applying the skills of analysis and evaluation to
one’s own inferential judgments with a view toward
questioning, confirming, validating, or correcting one’s
reasoning or results.
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Affective Dispositions and Critical Thinking
Although cognitive skills and situational factors influence the ability of someone
to think critically, it does not explain why some people seem to think critically often in a
given situation while others rarely do. If someone has all the requisite skills to think
critically but fails to do so, and a situational explanation cannot be found, it stands to
reason that there is a dispositional explanation for the lack of critical thinking. Based on
this observation, scientists and educators began looking for those internal factors which
cause an otherwise capable individual to engage in critical thinking or not. They were
looking for the “critical spirit” of the critical thinker, that way of living that is consistent
with critical thinking (Facione, 1998). It was agreed that critical thinkers are analytical,
inquisitive, judicious, open-minded, systematic, truth-seeking and possess cognitive
maturity (see table 2).
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Table 2
Affective dimensions of critical thinking (Facione, Sanchez, & Facione, 1994).
Dimension

Description

Analyticity

Prizing the application of reasoning and the use of evidence to
resolve problems, anticipating potential conceptual or practical
difficulties and consistently being alert to the need to intervene

Inquisitiveness

Being intellectually curious and possessing a desire to learn
even when the application of the knowledge is not readily
apparent

Open-mindedness

Being tolerant of divergent views and sensitive to the
possibility of one’s own bias

Systematicity

Being organized, orderly, focused and diligent in inquiry

Truth-seeking

Being eager to seek the best knowledge in a given context,
courageous about asking questions, and honest and objective
about pursuing inquiry even if the findings do not support
one’s self-interests or preconceived notions.

Cognitive Maturity

Trusting one’s own reasoning processes and the ability to lead
others in the rational resolution of problems

Judiciousness

Approaching problems, inquiry, and decision-making with a
sense that some problems are necessarily ill-structured, and
many times judgments must be made on standards, contexts
and evidence which preclude certainty.
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Training
Though there have been many advances in the study of training throughout the
last twenty years, three factors consistently emerge: needs assessment, training
methodology, and training evaluation. According to Wexley (1984), needs assessment
answers three questions: where should training be placed, what needs to be trained, and
who needs the training? Latham (1988) provides four methods for identifying training
needs: organization analysis, task analysis, person analysis, and demographic analysis. In
conducting an organization analysis the training program is linked to the goals of the
organization and is designed to minimize the technical obsolescence of the organization’s
members. The task analysis evaluates the tasks that the recipients of the training will be
required to do, taking care to anticipate the requirements of the job likely in the near
future. A person analysis is conducted to determine who needs training. Interviews with
trainers and managers, surveys, and self-nomination are all methods of conducting person
analyses. A demographic analysis is conducted to determine the training needs of entire
populations of workers. These studies are often inter-organizational and focus on groups
such as workers over fifty or on female managers (Latham, 1988).
A successful training method is designed to achieve four goals: presentation of
relevant information or concepts to be learned, demonstration of the knowledge, skills,
and abilities (KSAs) to be learned, create opportunities for trainees to practice the skills,
and provide feedback to trainees during and after practice. (Salas & Canon-Bowers,
2001). Training methodology is constantly evolving. Computer-based training has been
used for approximately twenty years, and has been consistently successful (Wexley,
15

1984), though now when we talk of computer-based training we are usually speaking of
distributed or distance learning. The convenience and savings of time and money that
Web-based training programs offer make them an attractive alternative to more
traditional methods. These new tools have greatly impacted the way training is
conducted, but we don’t know as much about the learning processes that occur with the
use of these media as we do about face-to-face classroom training (i.e., what level of
interaction between trainer and student is needed for effective knowledge transfer and
retention?) (Salas and Canon-Bowers, 2001). In addition to computer-based training,
simulators and simulation games are very popular training methods. Though the
cognitive processes and training design of these methods have been largely ignored,
simulation and behavior role modeling are usually effective in producing immediate
training effects as well as long-term retention (Salas and Canon-Bowers, 2001).

Training Critical Thinking
There is a great deal of interest in training people to be good critical thinkers.
Nearly everyone, from teachers to employers to military leaders has an interest in
developing the critical thinking skills of their charges. Latham (1988) predicted “jobs of
the future will require less memorizing of facts and procedures, fewer physical skills, and
far more conceptual ability” (p.550). There is little disagreement that cognitive skills can
be trained; these are seen as developable skills in much the same way artistic or
leadership skills can be developed (Facione, Facione and Giancarlo, 2000). Where there
is disagreement, however, is in whether affective dispositions can be trained. That is, can
16

we train someone to behave in a manner that is consistent with a disposition toward
critical thinking? Perkins and Tishman (1993) argue that the engagement in critical
thinking is indicative of a disposition toward critical thinking, but their argument requires
the ability for people to choose their activity. We hope to determine whether people,
given the knowledge of critical thinking dispositions, can perform the behaviors
associated with these dispositions in the context of thinking critically.

Hypotheses
1. Teams receiving instruction in the use of affective dispositions and cognitive skills
will exhibit these characteristics more during a critical-thinking task.
a. Teams in the cognitive skills condition will use cognitive skills to a greater
extent than teams in the control or affective dispositions condition, as
measured by both the behavioral and self-report ratings.
b. Teams receiving training in affective dispositions will use affective
dispositions to a greater extent than teams in the control or cognitive skills
condition, as measured by both the behavioral and self-report ratings.
c. Teams receiving both cognitive skills training and affective dispositions
training will use both affective dispositions and cognitive skills to a greater
extent than teams in the control condition, as measured by both the behavioral
and self-report ratings.
2. Behavioral measures of cognitive skills will correlate with the self-report measure of
cognitive skills.
17

3. Behavioral measures of affective disposition correlate with the self-report measure of
affective disposition
4. Teams displaying evidence of affective dispositions and cognitive skills perform
better on critical-thinking tasks.
a. The expert performance rating will be significantly and positively correlated
with the affective dispositions self-report score.
b. The expert performance rating will be significantly and positively correlated
with the affective dispositions behavioral observation score.
c. The expert performance rating will be significantly and positively correlated
with the cognitive skills self-report score.
d. The expert performance rating will be significantly and positively correlated
with the cognitive skills behavioral observation score.
5. Affective dispositions are closely related to the personality variable openness to
experience.
a. The behavioral measure of affective disposition will be highly correlated with
the personality measure of openness to experience.
b. The self-report measure of affective disposition will be highly correlated with
the personality measure for openness to experience.
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Method
Participants
One hundred-twenty students self-selected into the study from the USF
Psychology Subject Pool. The age of the participants ranged from 18 to 50, averaged
21.9 years (SD=5.13), with a median of 20. Each subject had worked an average of 4.74
years (SD=3.83), ranging from zero to twenty years. The median number of years of
work experience was four. Participants worked in three-person teams and were given
extra-credit in their classes in consideration of their participation.

Materials
Tactical Decision Games
We used a modified version of two Tactical Decision Games (TDGs) reprinted from The
Marine Corps Gazette (Schmitt, 1994). These paper-based scenarios are used by military
leaders as instructional aids to teach tactics, operations, and strategy. The TDGs were
modified to remove military terms that would hinder their understanding by non-military
undergraduate students and then used to stimulate and measure critical thinking.
Exit Questionnaire
This is a 26-item questionnaire developed by the researchers. It asked participants to rate
the performance of their group in effective team functioning, cognitive skills, and
affective dispositions. Participants indicated their agreement to questions such as “My
team had clear agreement on priorities” on a five-point Likert scale anchored at strongly
disagree and strongly agree.
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Personality Measure
This 60-item measure was developed with questions from the international
personality item pool. It is comprised of the 50-item “Big Five Domain” scale and the
10-item “Openness to Experience” scale (Goldberg, 1999).
TinkerToy® project
TinkerToys® are a children’s toy made of wooden rods and connecting pieces.
Three 66-piece junior builder TinkerToy® sets were combined, then divided into groups
of like shape and function and placed into new bins. One bin contained all connector
pieces, another all long rods, and the last bin contained medium-sized rods and wheels.

Procedure
Each team was welcomed and told they will be studying team dynamics during problemsolving tasks. After informed consent, consent to videotape, and demographic
information was gathered, the participants were asked to read along while listening to an
informative audio recording. Depending on condition, participants received instruction in
either cognitive skills used in critical thinking, affective dispositions of critical thinkers,
both of these, or neither of these. Those groups that did not receive training in both
cognitive skills and affective dispositions listened to training tapes on choosing college
classes or conducting a job search, such that they will have listened to a total of two
training tapes.
Assignment cards were then distributed to those groups who had listened to the
cognitive skills tape and/or the affective dispositions tape. These cards list one of the
20

cognitive skills or affective dispositions and its definition. Participants were instructed to
ensure the group engages in the skill or disposition they had been given. Teams received
a short training on effective teams and team building.
Each team was then asked to complete an “icebreaker” exercise, designed to
enable communication and cooperation, in which they built a tower of TinkerToys®. The
participants were reminded of the qualities of effective teams before the task began.
Teams were given one of the bins of TinkerToys and were instructed to build a tower as
tall as possible within fifteen minutes. They were limited by the inability to touch only
the pieces that came from their bin; they were not allowed to touch their teammates’
pieces. A discussion followed during which the team members examined their team and
individual performance and the degree to which they used their assignment cards and
reminded the group to exhibit the listed characteristics. They then discussed ways to
improve in future tasks, and were reminded of their assignment to ensure the group
exhibits the characteristics on their cards.
Next, participants were given their first Tactical Decision Game (TDG). The
group was again reminded of effective habits of teams, and was then presented with the
scenario and answer sheets. The group was asked to determine and prioritize their goals,
issue orders and justifications to the people under their command, and to use a map to
provide a visual aid to assist the researchers in understanding their solution. Teams
engaged in a discussion after the scenario in which they evaluated their performance and
reminded to use their assignment cards in the next task.
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The second TDG was given in the same manner as the first, with a reminder of
the qualities of effective teams. This scenario lasts up to an hour and is videotaped. The
participants then each completed a personality measure, and an exit questionnaire.

Scoring
SME Rating
A military expert used a five-point scale to rate the military effectiveness of the
orders given in each team’s solution to the second TDG. This score serves as an
objective measure of task performance based on performance-relevant criteria.
Behavioral Rating
After training to an acceptable level of agreement, three graduate students
individually viewed and rated the videotape of the second TDG of each group. The
frequency of exhibition of each of the six cognitive skills and seven affective dispositions
were made, as well as an overall rating (one to five) on each of these 13 dimensions.
Self-report
Team members were asked to complete a 24-item questionnaire assessing the
degree to which their team engaged in each of the thirteen affective dispositions and
cognitive skills, and assessed the degree to which the team members engaged in effective
team processes.
Results
The ratings of the three judges completing the behavioral ratings of cognitive
skills and affective dispositions evidence a high level of inter-judge agreement (type C
22

intraclass correlation coefficient = 0.87). A one-way between-subjects multivariate
analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) including the TDG expert rating, all the 34
dependent variables and three covariates listed in table 3 achieved multivariate
significance (F(90,246) = 1.647, p=0.001). The covariates of age, gender, and work
experience, however, were not significant (F(30,80) = 0.603, p>0.05; F(30,80) = 0.792,
p>0.05; F(30,80) = 1.116, p>0.05, respectively), and were thus removed from future
analysis. A one-way between-subjects multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) was
run on the remaining variables. This resulted in an overall significant main effect for
experimental condition (F(90,252) = 1.551, p<0.01). Subsequent univariate analysis
revealed a significant main effect for condition on subject matter expert (SME) ratings.
(F(3,113)=5.784, p<.001). A Games-Howell post-hoc analysis of the SME ratings reveals
the cognitive condition and the control condition scored higher than the affective group
condition (mean difference=0.7761, p<0.001 and 0.3937, p<0.05, respectively).
The overall behavioral ratings of each team reveal a difference among teams with
regard to the affective disposition of truth-seeking. Those teams that received affective
dispositions training (M=3.62, SD=0.846) received a higher overall rating on the truthseeking dimension of the behavioral rating than did the control group (M=2.88,
SD=0.878). The Games-Howell test shows this difference is significant at the p<.01
level. The behavioral ratings show a strong correspondence with the subject matter
expert ratings (r=0.80, p<.01), such that more behavioral expression of cognitive skills
and affective dispositions was associated with better solutions to the problem scenario as
judged by the subject matter expert.
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Figure 1
Subject matter expert ratings by training condition.
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Figure 2
Behavioral observation of Truthseeking dimension by training condition.
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Table 3
Variables used in multivariate analysis of covariance.

Independent
Variable (1)

Experimental condition
(training in cognitive skills, affective dispositions, both, or neither)

TDG expert rating (1)

Dependent
Variables (37)

Behavioral ratings (30)
a. Frequencies of affective dispositions exhibited, by dimension
(7)
b. Frequencies of cognitive skills exhibited, by dimension (6)
c. Total affective dispositions frequency (1)
d. Total cognitive skills frequency (1)
e. Global rating (1-5) for each category (13)
f. Total global rating for cognitive skills (1)
g. Total global rating for affective dispositions (1)
Self-report measures (6)
a. Affective disposition utilization self-report individual score (1)
b. Affective disposition utilization self-report team score (1)
c. Cognitive skills utilization self-report individual score (1)
d. Cognitive skills utilization self-report team score (1)
e. Team processes self report individual score (1)
f. Team processes self report team score (1)

Covariates (8)

Personality (5)
Age (1)
Sex (1)
Work experience (1)
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Figure 3
Variables analyzed.
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Discussion
This study sought to shed light on the influence of cognitive skills and affective
dispositions on team processes and outcomes on a critical-thinking task, to determine
which if any of the dimensions of critical thinking are trainable, and to do it using
objective measures when possible. Since our subject matter expert was unknown to both
participants and researchers and saw only the participants’ solutions, his or her ratings are
very objective ratings of critical thinking from an outcome perspective. A larger
challenge is developing objective process measures. The lack of a generally agreed-upon
taxonomy of critical thinking made the development of behavior-based scoring much
more difficult. This study provides evidence of the potential value of behavioral
observation in the study of critical thinking in teams.
Based on our subject matter expert outcome ratings, we found the cognitive and
control groups provided better solutions to the scenario than did the affective group.
Although not a significant difference, the “both” group tended toward the affective group.
This may indicate a deleterious effect of the affective training (as both groups received
it), or of the instruction to exhibit the characteristics described on their reminder cards.
Affective dispositions are generally harder to understand and integrate than cognitive
skills, and the additional attention required to implement the requested behavioral
changes could have detracted from their ability to complete the task assigned.
In behavioral ratings, we found the affective dispositions group exhibited an
overall score on truthseeking that was higher than the control group. This finding
suggests the affective dispositions training worked, that it increased the extent to which
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the teams engaged in truthseeking. If this difference was based solely on the affective
dispositions training we would expect to see a significant difference between the affective
dispositions group and the cognitive skills group, as they received no affective
dispositions training. A possible explanation for the lack of a significant difference is the
high degree of overlap between the six cognitive skills dimensions and the truthseeking
affective dispositions dimension. The correlations range from .32 to .45 and are all
significant at p=.05.
In addition to the findings relating to the trainability and performance influence of
cognitive skills and affective dispositions, this study developed a unique behavioral
analysis technique in order to objectively measure the expression of cognitive skills and
affective dispositions in group interactions.
In the course of conducting this experiment several researchers noted that
although the training sessions were somewhat tedious for all participants, they seemed to
be especially arduous for those in the “both” condition. Indeed, these participants were
trained in cognitive skills followed immediately by training in affective dispositions
whereas those in the “cognitive skills” or “affective dispositions” condition received one
or the other, followed by training in conducting a job search or choosing college classes.
We believe the different training programs were differentially relevant to the participants’
lives, and that this difference may have affected our ability to draw conclusions regarding
the efficacy of our training program. This difference can be seen in the responses to
question 23 of the exit questionnaire (see appendix D), which asks participants to rate the
degree to which they enjoyed the exercise. There is a small but compelling trend, in
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which the groups that received the most life-relevant training (the control group) enjoyed
the experiment more than the groups that received no life-relevant training (the “both”
condition), and the two groups that received one life-relevant training each were in
between. This effect did not achieve significance in our study but we believe a larger
sample would find significant differences. Future studies should take this into account
when designing training for control groups.
The data from behavioral analysis are rich and can provide information that
cannot be obtained through other means, particularly in the realms of collaborative
critical thinking and team processes. Though there is inherent value in the collection and
analysis of critical thinking data independent of outcome measures, it is heartening to see
such a high correlation (.80) with established measures of critical thinking. This lends
further credence to the behavioral method developed in this study, and to the taxonomy
that underlies it.
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